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Abstract
While the study of election theory is not a new field in and of itself, recent
research has applied various concepts in computer science to the study of
social choice theory, which includes election theory. From a security per-
spective, it is pertinent to investigate how stable election systems are in the
face of noise, disruption, and manipulation. Recently, work related to com-
putational election systems has also been of interest to artificial intelligence
researchers, where it is incorporated into the decision-making processes of
distributed systems. The quantitative analysis of a voting rule’s resistance
to noise is the robustness, the probability of how likely the outcome of the
election is to change given a certain amount of noise. Prior research has
studied the robustness of voting rules under very small amounts of noise,
e.g. swapping the ranking of two adjacent candidates in one vote. Our re-
search expands upon this previous work by considering a more disruptive
form of noise: an arbitrary reordering of an entire vote. Given k noise
disruptions, we determine how likely the election is to remain unchanged
(the k-robustness) by relating the k-robustness to the 1-robustness. We
can thereby provide upper and/or lower bounds on the robustness of voting
rules; specifically, we examine five well-established rules: scoring rules (a
general class of rules, containing Borda, plurality, and veto, among others),
Copeland, Maximin (also known as Minimax or Simpson–Kramer), Bucklin,
and plurality with runoff.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An election is generally defined as a collective decision-making process, con-
ducted by casting individual votes to express a preference. Using a prede-
fined rule, votes are tabulated in some manner, and a winner (or winners)
is determined. Mathematically speaking, a voting rule is simply a function
that outputs a winner given an input of votes. It is common to think of vot-
ing as simply choosing a single candidate, but more generally, a vote is an
ordered list of all the candidates, expressing preference by relative rank. The
selection of a single candidate is actually a ranking in which that candidate
is first, and all of the remaining candidates are in a tie for last place.
Most people are probably familiar with elections in political settings, in
which the citizens of a country, state, or other municipality vote to elect
governmental leaders and representatives. Perhaps the most common or rec-
ognizable form of political election is a single-winner election, in which the
scoring rule ultimately outputs exactly one winner. This is most obviously
used when there is only one position to fill, such as a head of government. It
is also common, however, to elect members to legislative bodies of govern-
ment via single-winner elections by assigning each seat to a multimember
constituency (a specific district or region), as is done in both houses of the
United States Congress and the lower houses of Parliament in the United
Kingdom and Canada. In these cases, a voter is casting a preference for a
specific individual.
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Multiple-winner elections are also common for electing officials to multiple-
member legislative bodies, usually by proportionally distributing seats based
on the number of votes for each party (rather than votes for a specific candi-
date). This system is used for the lower house of parliament in France (the
French National Assembly) and both houses of parliament in Italy. The
lower house of the German parliament (the Bundestag) is elected half by
a proportional multiple-winner election, and half by single-winner plurality
elections. There are also non-proportional multiple-winner voting systems,
which usually fill the n positions with the top n plurality winners, called
bloc voting or plurality-at-large. Generally, a bloc voting system is used
for smaller governing bodies, such as a council or a board, though there
are instances of legislative bodies being elected by non-proportional voting
systems.
The above examples of political elections are founded on a basic principle
of “one person, one vote,” giving each citizen an equal say. Outside of
the world of politics, this is rarely the case. In corporate elections, for
example, each shareholder may vote on issues such as who serves on the
board of directors, approval of sales and acquisitions, etc., but the votes
of a shareholder are weighted by the number of shares owned. This allows
any person or entity owning a majority of shares to retain control of the
company, as the majority shareholder cannot be outvoted. Furthermore,
corporations can issue different classes of shares with different voting rights.
This could allow for a non-majority shareholder to still retain the majority
of voting rights, and therefore retain control of the corporation.
Since the 13th century, mathematicians have studied methods for conducting
elections, which allow a group of voters to express their opinions on a given
set of candidates or issues. It would be reasonable to say that the outcome
of an election must best represent the aggregate preferences of the voters,
or the election has essentially failed its purpose. The study of elections and
voting rules has evolved into the field of preference aggregation, a major
component of social choice theory.
The general population, especially in the United States, may only be familiar
with single vote election systems that are common in modern democratic
governments. In practical terms, however, voters often have opinions about
many or all candidates, not just their first choice candidate. While many
common voting rules consider only the top-ranked candidate, there exist
more complex voting systems that take the rankings of every candidate into
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account. Resulting from extensive study of social choice mechanisms, many
alternative election systems have been developed based on entirely different
and more complex mathematical functions that weight the rankings of all
the candidates; we will explore several of these, including Copeland, Bucklin,
and Maximin.
Most likely, the complexities of these election systems have prevented their
widespread use in political elections, even though they may yield a winner
who, in some respects, more accurately represents the preferences of the
voters. The concerns of practicality are greatly mitigated in an electronic
context, however, and as a result the study of preference aggregation has
become increasingly relevant in multiagent scenarios and important to the
field of distributed artificial intelligence.
Conducting preference aggregation in an electronic context, especially when
networked, obviously presents a variety of security issues, many of which
have arisen during the deployment of electronic voting machines for use in
political elections. The alteration of the aggregate data, whether intentional
and malicious or accidental, clearly has the potential for enormous impact on
modern society. While the threat pertaining to decision making in artificial
intelligence may not seem as serious as in political elections, in both cases
there are opportunities to compromise an entire system that utilizes these
decision-making mechanisms.
One good measure to determine if a voting rule could be implemented prac-
tically in these contexts is robustness. The measure of robustness is the
quantitative analysis of the probability that the outcome of an election will
not change when the election data is altered by a given amount of noise.
The noise could in practice be either intentional manipulation of the data,
or unintentional random corruption. The measure of robustness is in some
ways applicable to both types, but the resistance of voting protocols to ma-
nipulation is an entire topic in and of itself [4, 6, 10, 13, 16, 29] that is far
beyond the scope of our research. We will instead focus our efforts on the
notion of robustness in the face of random noise.
Recently, Procaccia et al. [27] studied the robustness of an election under
noise in the form of a swaps between two adjacent candidates in a single
voter’s ordinal preference list. They call this form of noise an elementary
transposition. It is straightforward to see that an elementary transposition
represents the least significant possible change to a preference profile. This
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type of noise would ostensibly be random and unintentional. Procaccia et
al. defines the term 1-robustness as being the probability the the outcome
of an election remains unchanged after a single fault (one randomly chosen
elementary transposition), and k-robustness as the probability of robustness
given multiple (k) faults. Comprising the bulk of the research in Procaccia
et al. are the upper and/or lower bounds in terms of k-robustness for five
different well-established election rules: scoring rules, Copeland, Maximin,
Bucklin, and plurality with runoff. The bounds are all strictly worst case,
although we discovered in our own work that it is very difficult to prove
what specific distributions are actually the worst for a given election rule.
Our intention is to expand upon this research using more severe types of
noise and to study their effect on the outcomes of the same five election
rules. Procaccia et al. equates a single transposition to the flip of a single
bit in the bitwise encoding that they devised to represent ordinal preferences
in an election. The representation is a rather contrived construct designed
to provide a simple plausible explanation for even trivial amounts of noise
to have a real impact on the election outcome. Rather than delve into the
semantics of representation, we will waive this and suffice it to say that some
noise simply results in a specific type of alteration which is more significant
than a single transposition. As with Procaccia et al., the forms of noise are
intended to be unintentional and uncontrolled corruption, but some of the
expanded noise may also have applicability to malicious manipulation of the
system.
Procaccia et al. [27] is, in some ways, similar to Kalai’s [22] work on noise
sensitivity in social welfare functions. Kalai began with an assumption that
votes are distributed uniformly at random, and investigated whether changes
in a small percentage of voters’ preferences can result in social preferences
that differ from the originals. As mentioned above, there is also a large body
of work dedicated to exploring the intentional manipulation of elections.
Gibbard [16,17] studied manipulation of elections in 1973 and 1977, and in
1990, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [4] explored the difficulty of controlling an
election. More recently, in 2003 and 2005, Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [9,
10] researched the computational complexity of manipulation. In the past
few years, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [13–15]
have extensively examined the notions of bribery and control in elections,
and the associated computational complexity. Our work is based heavily on
the ideas of Procaccia et al. in that we explore the unintentional disruption
of more prominent voting rules, with the goal of further exploring robustness
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with increased noise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers the history
of elections, voting, and related research, including definitions of the voting
rules we have studied; Chapter 3 provides an overview of our goals as well
as the results of our research in the form of proofs of bounds on robustness;
Chapter 4 describes in detail the experiments we performed and the resulting
data; finally, Chapter 5 contains the conclusion, featuring a discussion of our
results and the experimental data obtained. Our initial research concerning
a form of noise we later chose not to focus on, called a suppression, can be
found in Appendix A, and the source code for the program used to obtain
experimental results is located in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 History of Social Choice
Most historians point to Athens, the ancient Greek city-state of circa 500
bce, as the birthplace of modern democracy. Though it is not generally
considered to be the first democratic state, it is noted to be the most stable
and important of the ancient world. Its form of government became a model
not only for other Greek cities, but remains an important model today. The
word democracy itself is in fact Greek, meaning power or rule (kratos) by
the people (demos). The fundamental principle of Athenian democracy was
that it was aggregative, providing the citizens an opportunity to influence the
laws by which they are bound; this was in sharp contrast to the monarchies
and oligarchies that preceded it. This basic tenet remains the foundation of
modern democracies.
Although several of the world’s foremost and famous mathematicians orig-
inated from ancient Greece, it does not appear that voting systems were
studied mathematically until the 13th century, by Ramon Llull of Ma-
jorca [18]. Even these contributions were unknown until the rediscovery
of Llull’s manuscripts in the mid-to-late 20th century. A few of the most
widely-known principles of election theory were discovered by Llull but lost
over time, only to be independently rediscovered centuries later. One of
these is the Borda voting system [26], a sequential descending scoring rule
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made famous by Jean-Charles de Borda in 1770, which we study in depth in
this paper; another is the Condorcet criterion [26], described by the Marquis
de Condorcet in 1785, which requires the winner of an election to be pre-
ferred over every other candidate. We do not study the Condorcet criterion
specifically, but two of the voting systems we do study, Copeland [11] and
Maximin [25,30], are Condorcet-compliant.
After the rediscovery of election theory by Condorcet and Borda in the
late 1700s, new work continued through the next century, most notably by
Charles Dodgson and Thomas Hare. Dodgson, more commonly known by
his pen name Lewis Carroll as the author of Alice’s Adventures in Won-
derland, was also a mathematician and election theorist. Proposed in an
1876 pamphlet, the system now known as Dodgson’s method is based upon
the Condorcet criterion [26]. If there is no Condorcet winner, Dodgson pro-
posed a method of determining a winner by choosing the candidate that is
“closest” to meeting the criterion [26,28].
Thomas Hare was a British lawyer and major proponent of electoral reform.
Hare published several editions of his electoral theory work between 1857
and 1873, in which he created the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system
still used in the Republic of Ireland and Australia [6], as well as the epony-
mous Hare quota that is sometimes used with STV. Hare, along with fellow
election reform proponent and Member of Parliament John Stuart Mill, also
popularized the idea of proportional representation, which is now used in
parliamentary elections of many European countries (though ironically not
in his home country).
Though many of the foundations of voting theory were laid in the works
of Llull, Borda, and Condorcet, the bulk of work has been conducted in
the 20th century and beyond. Several of the voting systems we will study
were conceived within the last century, including Copeland (1951) [11], Max-
imin, also known as Simpson–Kramer [25,30] (1969, 1977) or Minimax, and
Bucklin [7] (1911). Other widely-known modern election systems include
Black [5], Coombs [8] and Kemeny–Young [23,24,31].
Social choice theory, in its modern incarnation, was created by American
economist Kenneth Arrow and popularized in his 1951 book, Social Choice
and Individual Values [1]. Arrow’s social choice theory is a blend of voting
theory and welfare economics, essentially incorporating principles of sociol-
ogy and economics to broaden the scope of voting theory. Arrow describes
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how social values can be imposed by a “set of individual orderings,” es-
sentially a preference profile consisting of ranked votes, aggregated under a
“constitution,” which is a voting rule that maps a set of orderings to one
“social ordering.”
An important component of Arrow’s book is a theorem now commonly
known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, or Arrow’s paradox. Arrow de-
creed four “reasonable” requirements of any voting system—unanimity (also
called Pareto efficiency), unrestricted domain (also called universality), non-
dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant alternatives—and mathemat-
ically proves that no voting system allowing more than two choices can
ever uphold all of these principles simultaneously. The theorem is some-
times (controversially) condensed to statements such as “No voting method
is fair.” These principles as written by Arrow quickly became an important
framework for studying social choice that is still in place today.
In the past two decades, a new discipline has arisen known as computa-
tional social choice, in which the studies and principles of computer science
are applied to problems of social choice theory. The seminal work in this
area is generally considered to be a 1989 article by Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [3]. This work provides a proof that in a Dodgson election, in terms of
computational complexity it is NP-hard to simply determine if a particular
candidate is a winner of the election. Perhaps more importantly, the work
also provides a class of “impracticality theorems” which are somewhat anal-
ogous to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, as they assert that any fair voting
scheme must require excessive computation to determine a winner in the
worst case.
Just a few months after their first article, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick pub-
lished a second article [2] that specifically addresses computational complex-
ity of manipulating an election, as well as an election system that is resistant
to computational manipulation. This work provided much of the foundation
for future study of computational complexity. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaan-
dra, and Rothe have written extensively on this subject in the past decade,
covering topics such as the complexity of Dodgson elections [19], manipulat-
ing elections to prevent a specific candidate from winning [21], and resisting
manipulation by using hybrid elections [20].
Conitzer and Sandholm [10] studied the manipulability of several voting
rules in the context of multiagent systems. By bounding the elections in
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such a way that there are relatively few candidates, the work is able to
provide specific bounds on the computational complexity of manipulating
several different election rules. Both individual manipulation and “coali-
tional” manipulation by several agents in concert were considered. Conitzer
and Sandholm were able to determine that given information about other
agents’ votes, manipulation is very easy, even by an individual agent, as
long as votes are unweighted. They also concluded that manipulation under
a system of weighted votes is generally intractable. The conclusions of this
work and related works are generally that manipulation of an election is
easy, especially if the intended manipulation is “destructive,” meaning the
goal is simply to prevent one candidate from winning.
The emerging field of computational social choice was formalized in Decem-
ber 2006 with its first international workshop [12]. It is from the proceedings
of this conference that the primary basis for our research comes: a study
on the robustness of election systems by Procaccia et al. [27]. The work is
certainly not the first research pertaining to this field, however. Kalai [22] es-
sentially studied robustness of elections, but without using the specific term
“robustness.” Kalai’s work proposed the more general question of “How
likely is it that small random mistakes in counting the votes in an election
between two candidates will reverse the election’s outcome?” Assuming a
uniform and independent distribution of preferences, the work uses social
welfare functions with simple voting rules to analyze the robustness. Kalai
also defined the notion of “social chaos,” which is related to the probability
of finding cycles in the preferences. Interestingly, Kalai was also able to re-
late the the robustness under random noise the likelihood that a candidate
a is preferred to c, given that a is preferred to b and b is preferred to c. As
a whole, Kalai’s work is concerned more with social welfare functions and
random noise, rather than the specific voting rules and noise types of our
research.
Computational social choice has recently gained the attention of artificial in-
telligence researchers who seek to use voting methods to conduct preference
aggregation in multiagent systems. Since such preference aggregation often
occurs in networked computational environments, security concerns become
a major factor. Rather than random noise, these systems are susceptible to
manipulation, from both external entities who have acquired access to the
network, and especially by AI components of the multiagent system, which
may seek to manipulation the election they are participating in. By altering
their votes in such a manner as to not represent their actual preferences,
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but rather to affect the outcome of the election in some way.
The robustness of an election is defined to be the probability for which
an election’s outcome will remain unchanged given a certain disruption in
the voting data. Procaccia et al. [27] investigates the robustness of vari-
ous common voting systems with respect to elementary transpositions. An
elementary transposition is essentially the least significant possible change
that can be made to an election: in a single voter’s ranked preference list
of candidates, the positions of two adjacent candidates are swapped. The
work focuses specifically on the “1-robustness,” which is the probability of
robustness given a single such transposition. Procaccia et al. provides up-
per and/or lower bounds on the 1-robustness of five voting systems: scoring
rules, Copeland, Maximin, Bucklin, and Plurality with Runoff.
2.2 Notation
Procaccia et al. [27] uses conventional social choice notation from Brams and
Fishburn [6] to mathematically represent elections and their components. In
order to assist in both viewing this work as an extension of Procaccia et al.,
as well as within the context of computational social choice, we will follow
this same basic notation, with a few of our own additions.
Let the set of voters be V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and the set of candidates be
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} where n = |V | and m = |C|. The index i in superscript
refers to voters, and the index j in subscript refers to candidates. The set
of all linear orders on C is denoted by L = L(C). Each voter i has ordinal
preferences !i∈ L where the candidates are ranked cj1 !i cj2 !i · · ·! i cjm .
!V= 〈!1, . . . ,!n〉 ∈L N is a preference profile. pil(!i) denotes the candidate
that voter i ranks in the l’th position; similarly, the notation lij indicates
the ranking of candidate cj in ordinal preference list !i. The winner of an
election is decided by the voting rule, which is a function F : LV → C. This
mapping of preferences to candidates designates the winning candidate.
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2.3 Definitions of Voting Rules
The voting rules we have chosen to focus on are scoring rules, Copeland,
Maximin, Bucklin, and plurality with runoff. It is intentional that these
are the same rules studied in Procaccia et al. [27], as this allows us to
make a direct comparison between the results on robustness of elementary
transposition and arbitrary reordering. These rules are all firmly established
and well-studied within the field of social choice. This section defines, both
formally and informally, each of these rules. Though there is no one universal
method for tie-breaking an election in which more than one candidate has
the highest score, for the purposes of this work, a winning candidate will be
selected arbitrarily from the set of candidates with the highest score.
2.3.1 Scoring Rules
Scoring rules are actually representative of a generic class of election rules,
rather than a specific rule; however, since they can all be generically repre-
sented in the same way, we can study them together. Scoring rules are based
upon a scoring vector "α of size m that provides a score for each rank. A
candidate’s score in a given preference profile is simply the sum of its scores
based on its rank in each vote. The formal definition is as follows: given a
scoring vector "α = 〈α1, . . . ,αm〉, the score of a candidate j is sj =
∑
i αlij ,
and the winner of the election is F (!) = argmaxjsj .
Though the scoring vector "α is not constrained to any specific values, there
are some common scoring rules that have been studied (we were unable to
find authoritative references for plurality and veto, but these definitions are
widely accepted). Although our results are general and applicable to all
scoring rule implementations, we will focus these specific scoring vectors for
our experimental results:
• Borda: "α = 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0〉 [26]
• Plurality: "α = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉
• Veto: "α = 〈1, . . . , 1, 0〉
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2.3.2 Copeland [11,27]
The Copeland election rule is based upon the rankings of each candidate
relative to every other candidate. A series of pairwise elections is conducted,
each of which compares exactly two candidates to each other. The resulting
scores of the pairwise election are simply the number of times each candidate
was ranked higher than the other; the degree by which their ranks differ is
not a factor. For Copeland, every candidate competes in a pairwise election
against ever other candidate, and each candidate’s score is the number of
other candidates they beat. In the original Copeland definition, ties were
awarded half points; in some later works, including Procaccia et al. [27], this
is not done. The formal definition of Copeland as used in Procaccia et al.,
and for the purposes of this work, is as follows:
Candidate j beats j′ in a pairwise election if |{i : lij < lij′}| > n/2. The score
for candidate j, sj , is the number of candidates that j beats in pairwise
elections. The winner of the election Copeland(!) is argmaxjsj .
2.3.3 Maximin [25,30]
Maximin, sometimes called Minimax or Simpson–Kramer, consists of a series
of pairwise elections comparing each candidate to every other candidate,
similar to Copeland. In Maximin, however, the candidate’s score is its worst
pairwise score against the other candidates. The winner of the election is
still the candidate with the highest score, however, which could be thought
of as “the best of the worst.” Formally, the definition of Maximin is:
The score of candidate j is sj = minj′ |{i : lij < lij′}|, and the winner of
Maximin(!) is argmaxjsj .
2.3.4 Bucklin [7]
The Bucklin election system, while somewhat confusing in its mathematical
definition, is fairly simple in principle. A candidate needs a majority score,
more than half of n, to win. The election proceeds in rounds. The first
round looks only at the first-ranked candidate in each vote. If no candidate
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has a majority, the election proceeds to the second round, where the top
two ranks are considered, and so forth, iterating through each successive
rank. A candidate’s score is simply the total number of combined votes it
has in all currently-considered ranks. If at any time a candidate reaches a
majority score, the election is stopped, and that candidate is declared the
winner. Formally, Bucklin is defined as:
For all candidates cj and l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let Bj,l = {i : lij ≤ l}. The winner
of Bucklin(!) is argminj(min{l : |Bj,l| > n/2}).
2.3.5 Plurality with Runoff[9]
Plurality with Runoff is a hybrid election, which always consists of two
rounds. The first round is a plurality election, as defined above in Scoring
Rules; however, rather than a single winner, this first round returns the two
candidates with the highest plurality scores. These two candidates proceed
to a runoff election, which is pairwise. The runoff candidate with the higher
pairwise score wins the overall election.
More formally, the two candidates who maximize |{i ∈ N : lij = 1}|, move
on to a pairwise runoff election for the second round, of which the winner is
the candidate j such that |{i : lij < lij′}| > n/2.
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Chapter 3
Robustness in Voting
Function Lower Bound Upper BoundTransposition Reordering Transposition Reordering
Scoring Rule m−1−aFm−1
(# maF+1 $!)
aF+1
m!
m−aF
m 1− 2m(aF−1)−aF
2−aF+1
2m!
Copeland 0∗ 0† 1m−1 1− (m+1)(m−1)!−22m!
Maximin 0∗ 0† 1m−1 1− (m−1)!−1m!
Bucklin m−2m−1
((
m−1
2
)
!
)2
m!
1∗ 1†
Plurality w. Runoff m−5/2m−1
7
6m
‡ m−5/2
m−1 +
5/2
m(m−1)
9m−10
4m2
‡
Table 3.1: Comparison of the upper and lower bounds of various scoring
rules for elementary transposition and arbitrary reordering. The bounds
for elementary transposition are from Procaccia et al. [27]; the bounds for
arbitrary reordering are from our own work and discussed in detail in this
chapter.
∗These bounds are as provided in [27], but it is unlikely they represent actual bounds.
In these cases the authors indicated they felt the actual bounds were inconsequential.
†These values are not intended to denote the actual bounds, but simply indicate these
particular values were beyond the scope of this work and have been replaced by the
absolute minimum or maximum bound.
‡These bounds only hold for values of m ≥ 3, but we find this to be a reasonable
assumption on the minimum size of an election.
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3.1 Overview
Recently, Procaccia et al. [27] conducted research on robustness in voting.
Specifically, the work was focused on the the smallest possible amount of
noise, the single elementary transposition. Procaccia et al. derived upper
and/or lower bounds for five different established voting rules. The authors
offer a specific binary representation of a preference profile in order to sup-
plement their fault model. Specifically, the representation uses a single bit
to represent each of the
(m
2
)
candidate pairs; a value of 1 indicates the first
candidate is preferred to the second, and a value of 0 is a preference for the
second candidate over the first. While it is intuitive that this is not the most
compact form of representation, which the authors note, they do elaborate
on some advantages; specifically, there is the possibility to check for certain
properties of the election in constant time using bitmasks. It has a major
disadvantage in that it is possible to represent an inconsistent preference
profile, in that there the transitivity can be violated. While this is not dif-
ficult to detect, it is still an impossible occurrence in a more conventional
list-based representation.
We will expand the notion of noise to include more significant alterations to
the preference profile; specifically, we will examine the impact of a voter’s
ordinal preferences being scrambled (arbitrarily reordered), which itself is
actually equivalent to a series of elementary transpositions confined to the
context of a single voter. In our preliminary research, we also investigated
the notion of suppression, in which a single voter’s entire ordinal preference
list is not considered in determining the election outcome; however, we were
unable to obtain interesting results from this, and consequently removed it
from the final work. The preliminary work regarding suppression can be
found in Appendix A.
While the Procaccia et al. [27] representation certainly provides a justifi-
cation for allowing the smallest possible data corruption, a single but flip,
to impact the outcome of the election, we did not find it necessary in our
work to focus on a specific representation of our fault model. The pairwise
binary representation is somewhat contrived in that its design is admittedly
inefficient and exists largely to bolster the contention that even minor data
corruption can impact an election. While it may be worthwhile to provide a
concrete example of the potential ramifications of such a corruption, we do
not feel it necessary to expound upon this any further. We find the imple-
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mentation details to be generally irrelevant to the actual impact of the noise
on the robustness of the election. Given these expanded criteria for noise,
we will examine the effects on the k-robustness of the same election rules
as Procaccia et al. [27]: basic scoring rules (Plurality, Veto, and Borda),
Copeland, Maximin, Bucklin, and Plurality with Runoff.
3.2 Definitions
Procaccia et al. [27] focuses exclusively on one type of noise, the elementary
transposition. This consists of a swap between the rankings of two adjacent
candidates in a single voter’s ordinal preference list, and is arguably the
“smallest” amount of noise possible. As such, it can even be considered the
building block of more exaggerated forms of noise, and we will use it as such.
We include here the Procaccia et al. definition of elementary transposition:
Definition 1. A preference profile !V1 is obtained from a preference profile
!V by an elementary transposition (write: !V!!V1 ) if there exists a voter
vi and l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that:
1. for all i′ (= i, !i′=!i′1
2. pil(!i) = c = pil−1(!i1)
3. pil−1(!i) = c′ = pil(!i1)
4. !i↓C\{c,c′}=!i1↓C\{c,c′}
The !i↓C\{c,c′} notation is used by Procaccia et al. [27] without a specific
definition, but we understand it to be defined as the preference profile !i
with candidates {c, c′} removed from consideration.
We build upon this concept of a single transposition to create a more severe
form of noise, which we call an arbitrary reordering. The reordering consists
of a random permutation of a single voter’s ordinal preference list. This
form of noise is strongly linked to elementary transpositions, as an arbitrary
reordering could easily be defined to consist of a series of multiple elemen-
tary transpositions confined to a single voter within the preference profile.
Arbitrary reordering is formally defined as follows:
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Definition 2. Given a preference profile !V and a voter vi ∈ V , the pref-
erence profile !V1 is obtained from !V by an arbitrary reordering if for all
i′ (= i, !i′=!i′1 .
We measure the effects of noise on an election or voting rule in terms of
robustness: the probability that given some sort of noise, disruption, or
alteration of the preference profile data, the outcome of the election is un-
affected. Specifically, we are interested in the k-robustness, which is defined
here as the probability of robustness given k independent noise faults:
Definition 3. The k-robustness of a preference profile !V under an arbi-
trary reordering of k voters vi ∈ V for i = 1, . . . , k, written φk(!V ) = !V1 ,
is:
ρφk(F,!V ) = Pr&V1 ∼φk(&V )
[
F (!V ) = F (!V1 )
]
.
The notation !V1 ∼ φk(!V ) is adapted from Procaccia et al. [27], in which it
is defined to be the probability of obtaining !V1 from !V by k faults chosen
randomly and independently.
Once the k-robustness of the preference profile is established, it is straight-
forward to link the robustness to the voting rule itself:
Definition 4. The k-robustness of a voting rule F under arbitrary reorder-
ing of k voters vi ∈ V for i = 1, . . . , k with n voters and m candidates
is:
ρn,mφk (F ) = min&V1 ∈L(C)n
ρφk(F,!V1 ).
3.3 Theorems
Largely in order to simplify our contention that the arbitrary reordering is
strongly linked to the elementary transposition, which consequently simpli-
fies proofs of our work in relation to Procaccia et al. [27], we explicitly prove
the relation:
Proposition 1. Every arbitrary reordering can be obtained by a series of at
most m
2−m
2 elementary transpositions.
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Proof. Since the arbitrary reordering is confined to a single voter’s ordinal
preference list, !i, the elementary transpositions take place on one list of size
m, i.e. | !i | = m. It therefore can take at most m− 1 transpositions to get
the first list element in !i to match its position in the arbitrarily reordered
list; that is, to order the list such that pi1(!i1) = pi1(!i). Subsequently, it
will take at most m− 2 transpositions for the second element, m− 3 for the
third, etc., resulting in the summation
m−1∑
h=1
m − h. It is straightforward to
see that this summation is equal to
m2 −m
2
, which is the upper bound to
obtain an arbitrary reordering via a series of elementary transpositions.
Following the proof of Proposition 1, it is a simple case to prove that an ar-
bitrary reordering can alter the outcome of an election. Procaccia et al. [27]
already proves this for elementary transpositions in Theorem 1, included
below.
Theorem 1 [27]. Let F : LV → C be a voting rule such that Range(F ) > 1.
Then there exists a preference profile !V and a profile !V1 which is obtained
from !V by an elementary transposition, such that F (!V ) (= F (!V1 ).
Theorem 2. Let F : LV → C be a voting rule such that Range(F ) > 1.
Then there exists a preference profile !V and a profile !V1 which is obtained
from !V by an arbitrary reordering, such that F (!V ) (= F (!V1 ).
Proof. Since !V1 can be obtained from !V by a series of elementary trans-
positions, per Proposition 1, the proof of this claim follows inherently from
the Procaccia et al. [27] proof for Theorem 1.
To provide a link between k-robustness and 1-robustness, Procaccia et al. [27]
bounds k-robustness by the kth power of 1-robustness, as seen below in their
Proposition 2. We do the same, but define k in terms of an arbitrary re-
ordering.
Proposition 2 [27]. ρn,mk (F ) ≥ (ρn,m1 (F ))k.
Proposition 3. Given k arbitrary reorderings, ρn,mφk (F ) ≥ (ρ
n,m
φ1
(F ))k.
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Proof. Consider the preference profile !V1 and the preference profile !V k2 ob-
tained from it by k independent and random arbitrary reorderings. We claim
the probability that F (!V1 ) = F (!V k2 ) is at least (ρn,mφ1 )k. Let !Vi1 , . . . ,!V
k
ik+1
be the intermediate preference profiles obtained by the reorderings, where
!Vi1 = !V1 , !V
k
ik+1 = !V2 , and each !Vij+1 is obtained from !Vij by a random
and independent arbitrary reordering for j = 1, . . . , k. By the definition
of 1-robustness, for every preference profile !V i , the probability that one
randomly chosen arbitrary reordering does not change the outcome of the
election under F is at least ρn,mφ1 (F ). Therefore, for j = 1, . . . , k,
Pr
[
F (!Vij ) = F (!Vij+1) | !Vij
]
≥ ρn,mφ (F ).
Therefore:
Pr
[
F (!V1 ) = F (!V2 )
]
=
k∏
j=1
Pr
[
F (!Vij ) = F (!Vij+1) | !Vij
]
≥ (ρn,mφ1 )k.
Above, we have used the concept of 1-robustness as a lower bound for the k-
robustness. This is done in the same manner as Procaccia et al. [27] and for
exactly the same reasons: a high lower bound implies a high k-robustness,
while a low 1-robustness indicates that the k-robustness of the rule is not
worth considering.
Now that we have clearly defined our models for noise, as well as the def-
initions of their robustness, we will apply these in order to examine the
k-robustness of the voting rules (Plurality, Veto, Borda, Copeland, Max-
imin, and Plurality with Runoff) in much the same manner as Procaccia et
al. [27], with the exception of the definition of a fault. Rather than each
of the k faults indicating a single elementary transposition, we will rede-
fine a fault within the context of our noise; that is, k instances of arbitrary
reordering.
Recall that the specific type of noise we are working with, the “arbitrary
reordering,” is in effect simply a permutation of a single vote. In bounding
the robustness of the election rules below, we may refer to the arbitrary
reordering in a mathematical context as a permutation. For all of the rules
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we discuss, there are m candidates, and therefore in each vote there are m!
possible permutations, or arbitrary reorderings. We may refer to a set of
permutations as “safe” if no permutation of that form can possibly alter the
election outcome, thereby contributing to the quantification of robustness.
3.4 Scoring Rules
In this section, we attempt to quantify the robustness generally for all scoring
rules. It is difficult to obtain meaningful results for such a broad class of
rules, as the scoring vector "α significantly affects the resulting robustness.
Given a scoring rule F with scoring vector "α, let AF = {l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} :
αl−1 > αl}, and aF = |AF |. The robustness of a scoring rule is strongly
linked to the parameter aF , as the scores can only change when the noise
violates the boundaries in the scoring vector. To find the lower bound for
scoring rules, we claim that the worst case distribution is when each of the
score groups contained within in AF are of equal size.
Proposition 1. Let n and m be the number of voters and candidates, and
let F be a scoring rule. Then ρn,m1 ≥
(, maF+1-!)aF+1
m!
.
Proof. When there are aF divisions in the scoring vector, there are aF + 1
distinct groups of equal scores. One way to guarantee that the outcome of
the election remains the same after a vote is reordered is to require that the
reordering causes no candidate to “jump” across the divisions in AF that
bound each score group. For each of the aF + 1 groups of size rs, there are
rs! possible permutations that meet this restriction. Therefore, the total
number of acceptable permutations is
aF+1∏
s=1
rs!.
This value must be minimized when the score groups in "α are as close to
equal as possible; that is, when the size of each group is between , maF+1-
and . maF+1/. When this is the case, the probability that the outcome of the
election F will not change must be at least
(, maF+1-!)aF+1
m!
.
The upper bound is similarly dependent on the score groupings in AF . In
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this case, we find that skewing the distribution to one end, just the opposite
of the equal groupings used in the lower bound, allows us to provide a tighter
upper bound.
Proposition 2. Let n and m be the number of voters and candidates, and
let F be a scoring rule. Then ρn,m1 ≤ 1−
2m(aF − 1)− aF 2 − aF + 1
2m!
.
Proof. Given that there are aF + 1 groups of equal scores in the scoring
vector "α, we can guarantee a change in the outcome of the election F by
strictly increasing the score of one candidate while strictly decreasing the
score of another. We can accomplish this by reordering a vote such that two
candidates associated with different score groups switch places in the ordinal
preferences, as long as neither of the candidates is the winning candidate
cW .
For each candidate cj ∈ C, we can swap with any of the other m candidates,
less the candidates in cj ’s own scoring group and the winning candidate
cW . Denoting the size of candidate cj ’s scoring group as ajF , the number of
such swaps is the sum
∑
j∈C−{cW }
m− ajF − 1. Removing the constant terms
yields the sum (m − 1)2 −
∑
j∈C−{cW }
ajF . In order to maximize the number
of outcome-altering reorderings, aF of the score groups in "α must be of size
1, and one such group must contain the winning candidate. The remaining
score group is of size (m − aF ). Since ajF = 1 for all but one score group,
the expanded summation is (m− 1)2 − aF − (m− aF )2. To correct double
counting, this entire value is divided by 2. Subtracting from 1 to find the
robustness, the result is 1− 2m(aF − 1)− aF
2 − aF + 1
2m!
.
3.5 Copeland
To provide an upper bound on Copeland, we use a vote distribution in
which all votes are divided into two groups with inverted ordinal preferences.
Although it may seem at first glance that the rank of the winning candidate
will affect the number of safe permutations, we prove that because each
candidate has a corresponding rank in the second inverted vote group, the
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rank of the candidate within any randomly selected vote is irrelevant in
considering the robustness of the rule.
Proposition 3. Let m be the number of candidates, and let n, the number
of voters, be even. Then ρn,m1 (Copeland) ≤ 1−
(m+ 1)(m− 1)!− 2
2m!
.
Proof. Consider an election in which for i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , n − 1, the ordinal
preferences of voters vi and vi+1 fall into one of two preference profiles:
!i !i+1
c1 cm
c2 cm−1
· ·
· ·
cm c1
In the above scenario, for every two candidates c and c′, exactly n/2 voters
prefer c. Therefore, the Copeland score for every candidate is 0, and the
winner is an arbitrary candidate c ∈ C. Given the winning candidate cj ,
where j is the candidate’s rank in !i, we can guarantee the outcome of
the election will change under an arbitrary reordering in which the ranking
of cj strictly decreases in any one vote, or in which the rank of any other
candidate increases.
If such a vote is contained by the preference profile !i, there are m − j
decreasing positions in which to place cj , and therefore (m − j)(m − 1)!
permutations which decrease cj ’s score. It is also possible to alter the out-
come of the election by increasing the score of any other candidate, which
is achieved by fixing the position of cj and allowing any other permuta-
tion. Therefore, subtracting 1 to remove the identity permutation, there are
(m− j+1)(m−1)!−1 permutations guaranteed to alter the outcome of the
election. The alternative, with equal probability, is that the altered vote is
contained in the preference profile !i+1. In this case, there are j−1 decreas-
ing positions in which to place cj , and therefore j(m− 1)!− 1 permutations
guaranteed to alter the outcome of the election.
The probability of reordering a vote such that the outcome of the election
will change is then 12 [(m− j + 1)(m− 1)!− 1]+ 12 [j(m− 1)!− 1]. Factoring
out the common 12(m− 1)!, it is clear that the j terms cancel and thus the
position j of the winning candidate cj is irrelevant in calculating the num-
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ber of outcome-altering reorderings. Taking into account the total number
of permutations, m!, the probability of changing the election outcome is
(m+ 1)(m− 1)!− 2
2m!
. Subtracting from 1 to find the robustness, the result
is ρn,m1 (Copeland) ≤ 1−
(m+ 1)(m− 1)!− 2
2m!
.
3.6 Maximin
To find an upper bound for the robustness of Maximin, we construct an ad-
versarial preference profile with specific properties that ensures each candi-
date’s score is tied. This distribution ensures the promotion of any candidate
within any preference profile, except for the winner, changes the outcome
of the election. By maximizing the probability a reordering will promote a
non-winning candidate, we thereby minimize the upper bound. Our proof
uses from Proposition 8 of Procaccia et al. [27], which is included below.
Proposition 8 [27]. Let n and m be the number of voters and candidates
such that m divides n. Then ρn,m1 (Maximin) ≤ 1/(m− 1).
Proposition 4. Let m be the number of candidates and n be the number of
voters such that m divides n. Then ρn,m1 (Maximin) ≤ 1−
(m− 1)!− 1
m!
.
Proof. We will iteratively construct the preference profile in the same man-
ner as Procaccia et al. does in Proposition 8. In the first iteration, each
voter’s only linear preference is candidate c1. In the next iteration, candi-
date c2 is ranked first for 1mn voters, and below c1 for the remaining
m−1
m n
voters. In each subsequent iteration, candidate cj is ranked first among the
1
mn candidates who ranked cj−1 last; the remaining candidates rank cj im-
mediately below cj−1. For example, given 8 voters and 4 candidates, the
resultant preference profiles would be as follows:
!1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
c2 c2 c3 c3 c4 c4 c1 c1
c3 c3 c4 c4 c1 c1 c2 c2
c4 c4 c1 c1 c2 c2 c3 c3
c1 c1 c2 c2 c3 c3 c4 c4
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Each candidate cj is ranked in each position j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} exactly nm
times. Given a winning candidate cw contained within any preference pro-
file, we can guarantee a change in the outcome of the election under an
arbitrary reordering by fixing the position of cw and reordering the remain-
ing m − 1 candidates in the profile. This yields (m − 1)! reorderings that
alter the election outcome, less one for the identity permutation. Consider-
ing the total possible m! permutations and subtracting from one to find the
robustness, the result is ρn,m1 (Maximin) ≤ 1−
(m− 1)!− 1
m!
.
3.7 Bucklin
The Bucklin rule progressively considers each successive ranking until a plu-
rality is reached. We define the threshold rank at which this occurs as l0. By
proving permutations isolated by the threshold as a barrier, we also prove
lower bound by maximizing the number of safe permutations.
Proposition 5. Let m be the number of candidates and n be the number of
voters. Then ρn,m1 (Bucklin) ≥
((
m−1
2
)
!
)2
m!
.
Proof. Assume candidate cj is the winner of the election and satisfies l0 =
minlB(j, l) > n/2; in other words, l0 is the lowest rank in the preference
profile considered when determining the winner of the election. We claim
that under an arbitrary reordering, the outcome of the election does not
change as long as the candidate ranked in position l0 is fixed and the candi-
dates ranked above and below l0 do not cross the “boundary” of l0. There
are three cases to consider for proof of this claim:
Case 1: For any voter i and any candidate ck where lik < l0, consider any
promotion or demotion ck such that lik < l0 still holds true. No such change
in rank can alter the outcome of the election, as B(k, l1) remains unchanged
for all l1 ≤ l0.
Case 2: For any voter i and any candidate ck where lik > l0, any change of
rank of ck such that lik > l0 still holds true cannot alter the outcome of the
election. The condition minlB(j, l) > n/2 is already satisfied at position
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l0; therefore, no candidate whose rank lik > l0 could affect the score or the
election outcome.
Case 3: For any voter i and any candidate ck where lik < l0, it is easy to see
that a demotion with resulting rank lik > l0 can alter the election outcome if
ck = cj . Likewise, a promotion of a candidate ck where lik > l0 with resulting
rank lik < l0 could potentially alter the outcome of the election if ck (= cj .
The fourth case not explicated is a change of rank for candidate ck with
rank lik = l0. It is straightforward to see that changes at position l0 may
alter the outcome of the election.
For any ordinal preference list !i, fixing the position of the candidate pil0(!i)
results in two “groups” of candidates that may be reordered per the above
cases. For each group of size rs, the number of permutations which cannot
affect the election outcome is rs!. The worst case is therefore the one that
minimizes the size of the two groups, which occurs if l0 = m/2, and the
size of each group is m−12 . Therefore, the robustness is ρ
n,m
1 (Bucklin) ≥((
m−1
2
)
!
)2
m!
.
3.8 Plurality with Runoff
Plurality with runoff presents a unique challenge in that it utilizes two differ-
ent election rules in two rounds; therefore, the effect of arbitrarily reordering
a vote must be considered for both rounds. We construct an adversarial
preference profile similar to that which we used for Maximin, in that all m
candidates have equal scores in the plurality election. In order to derive the
worst case distribution, we maximize the potential for altering the election
outcome by ranking the arbitrary winners of the plurality election in last
place for all remaining votes. In such a distribution, the promotion of any
candidate to first place will affect the election result.
Proposition 6. Let n be the number of voters and m be the number of can-
didates, such that m | n. Then for all m ≥ 3, ρn,m1 (Plurality with Runoff) ≤
9m− 10
4m2
.
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Proof. Our preference profile is constructed as follows: The n votes are
distributed into m groups of identical votes, each of equal size nm . Each
group ranks its eponymous candidate first, e.g. A = {!i: pi1(!i) = ca}. In
groups A and B, the rank of the remaining candidates is irrelevant. For the
remaining groups, candidates ca and cb are ranked in the last two positions:
half such that pim(!i) = ca, and half such that pim(!i) = cb; the order
of the remaining candidates is again irrelevant. For display purposes, the
irrelevant candidates are ranked in order. The resulting distribution is the
following:
A B C D · · ·
ca cb cc cd
cb ca cd cc
...
...
...
...
cy cy ca cb
cz cz cb ca
In this distribution, all candidates have equal scores in the plurality election,
and candidates ca and cb are chosen as the winners to compete in the pairwise
runoff. In the runoff election, candidates ca and cb have equal pairwise scores,
and ca is chosen as the winner of the election.
For votes in group A, demotion of ca (and thus promotion of some other
candidate to first place) will reduce ca’s score such that it may no longer
be a winner of the plurality election. Votes in group B are similar in that
demoting cb reduces that candidate’s score such that it may no longer be a
winner of the plurality election, and any replacement candidate has a higher
pairwise score than ca. Therefore, the first-ranked candidates in groups
A and B must remain fixed to ensure there is no change in the election
outcome.
The remaining vote groups are all identical in terms of the effect of an
arbitrary reordering: the first-ranked candidate may not be demoted and
replaced by another candidate except for ca or cb, as the promotion of other
candidates to first place will guarantee that candidate a win in both the
plurality and the runoff elections. Even when the top candidate is fixed,
however, exactly half of the votes rank cb below ca, and half the permutations
on the lower candidates will alter the relative positions of ca and cb; therefore,
there is a 14 probability a permutation of the bottom m− 1 candidates will
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increase cb’s pairwise score over ca, and thus change the outcome of the
election. When ca is promoted to first place, all permutations of the lower
m−1 candidates are safe, as cb will always be ranked lower. If cb is promoted
to first place, cb will clearly rank above ca for all permutations of the lower
candidates, but cb’s pairwise score relative to ca only increases for the half
of the votes in which cb was ranked below ca to begin with.
Since there are m groups, the probability of choosing either group A or
B is 2m . The probability a permutation does not demote the first place
candidate is (m−1)!m! . The probability of choosing any other groups is
m−2
m .
For these groups, the probability a permutation is safe is 34 if the existing
winner is fixed, 1 if ca is promoted to first, and 12 if cb is promoted to first,
as described above. The total probability of a safe permutation is therefore
3(m− 1)!
4m!
+
(m− 1)!
m!
+
(m− 1)!
2m!
=
9(m− 1)!
4m!
. The resulting probability of
robustness is
2
m
· (m− 1)!
m!
+
m− 2
m
· 9(m− 1)!
4m!
=
9m− 10
4m2
.
Proposition 7. Let m be the number of candidates and n be the number of
voters. Then for all m ≥ 3, ρn,m1 (Plurality with Runoff) ≥
7
6m
.
Proof. Given candidate ca as the winner of the overall election, by definition
ca is also one of two winners of the plurality election. There must then be
a second winner of the plurality election, candidate cb. We define set Va to
be {!i: pi1(!i) = ca}, Vb to be {!i: pi1(!i) = cb}, na = |Va|, and nb = |Vb|.
In a worst case distribution, a first place vote for candidates ca or cb cannot
be altered, or else robustness is not guaranteed. Therefore, for any vote
contained within Va ∪ Vb has a minimum of (m−1)!m! safe permutations. It
logically follows that all remaining votes /∈ Va ∪ Vb may be divided into two
groups: the votes in which ca is preferred to cb, Va&b, and the votes in which
cb is preferred to ca, Vb&a.
For votes in Va&b, any permutation that promotes ca to first place is safe,
of which there are (m−1)!m! . Additionally, of the
(m−1)!
m! votes for which the
existing first place candidate remains unchanged, exactly half maintain ca’s
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relative position above cb, and thus are also safe. Therefore, for votes con-
tained in the set Va&b, there are at least 3(m−1)!2m! safe permutations.
For votes in Vb&a, it is again true that any permutation that promotes ca to
first place is safe, of which there are (m−1)!m! . In this case, since cb is preferred
to ca, a switch in their relative order only increases the pairwise score of ca
over cb; therefore, all permutations which maintain the existing first place
candidate are also safe, of which there are also (m−1)!m! . It follows that for
votes contained in the set Vb&a, there are at least 2(m−1)!m! safe permutations.
With the inclusion of probabilities, the result is a lower bound of
( |Va|+ |Vb|
n
)
1
m
+( |Va&b|
n
)
3
2m
+
( |Vb&a|
n
)
2
m
. It is possible to improve this bound with fur-
ther analysis by fixing the sizes of the vote sets without making any assump-
tions about the specific distribution. In order to minimize the bound, we
maximize the multiplicative factor of the smallest term: 1m .
First we consider the size of Va. If more than half the first place votes are
for ca, or |Va| > n2 , it is clear that no other candidate may possibly beat
ca in either the plurality or runoff elections given only a single fault. It is
straightforward to see that a distribution in which the outcome cannot be
changed is obviously not a worst case distribution; therefore, we fix the size
of set Va at n2 .
Since it is a given that cb loses to ca in the pairwise runoff, it is clear that
in a worst case, cb must be challengeable by a third candidate who can win
the runoff. In order for this to be possible, cb may have no more than half
of the remaining n2 votes, so we fix the size of Vb at
n
4 .
With the smallest term, 1m , maximized, we consider the next smallest term:
3
2m . To maximize this term, we can reasonably assign all remaining votes
to it, fixing the remaining set sizes as |Va&b| = n4 and |Vb&a| = 0. Without
making assumptions about the specific distribution other than it is a worst
case, we have achieved a lower bound of
3n
4
n
· 1
m
+
n
4
n
· 3
2m
=
9
8m
.
The 1m term used above is dependent upon the assumption that ca is at
risk of losing the plurality election; however, per the above fixed maximum
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value, ca is not challengeable. This allows us to reconsider the set sizes
so that either ca and cb may be defeated in the plurality. To create an
opportunity for a third candidate, we fix the size of Va ∪ Vb as 2n3 , and Va&b
as n3 .
Given this distribution, there is the possibility for ca to lose the plurality
election, or for cb to be replaced in the runoff by a candidate with a higher
pairwise score than ca, which are properties that follow logically for a worst
case distribution. With these adjusted terms, we achieve a lower bound of
2n
3
n
· 1
m
+
n
3
n
· 3
2m
=
7
6m
.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Bounds on
Robustness
4.1 Overview
In an attempt to provide more meaningful results for the robustness of
these election rules, we conducted experiments that provide hard data for
an average-case scenario. We wrote a program in Python that generates
elections and randomly introduces noise to them. Each generated prefer-
ence profile is run through each of six election rules: Borda, plurality, veto,
Copeland, Maximin, Bucklin, and plurality with runoff. The winning can-
didate is recorded both before and after the noise fault is introduced, and
the robustness is recorded. The resulting data is an average robustness for
each election rule. The source code for the experiments can be found in
Appendix B.
More specifically, the program generates elections in succession for all values
of n (the number of voters) andm (the number of candidates) such that 10 ≤
n ≤ 250 and 3 ≤ m ≤ 20. The generated preference profiles are one of two
types, per user input: random or “adversarial.” The random profile is a set
of cardinality n containing random permutations of 〈1, 2, . . . ,m〉. The ad-
versarial profile is a set of cardinality n that contains successive left circular
shifts of 〈1, 2, . . . ,m〉, i.e. {〈1, 2, . . . ,m〉, 〈2, 3, . . . ,m, 1〉, 〈3, 4, . . . ,m, 1, 2〉, . . .}.
30
(Note that adversarial profiles for which m | n have the property that the
pairwise score of any two candidates is equal.)
The purpose of the adversarial profile is to approximate a worst case. While
no one profile can serve as the worst case for all six of these rules, it seems
logical that an election in which all the candidates’ scores are equal must be
close to a worst case, as it is easy to shift the outcome of the election with
a single shift in the scores. The adversarial profile also serves as a “control”
against the random elections, since their makeup is consistent across all
values of n and m, and not dependent on a random number generator.
After each preference profile is generated, the winners of each of the six
election rules are recorded for future comparison, and 100 faults (noise) are
introduced independent of one another; that is, the noise is not successive
or compounded, but rather the fault is removed from the profile before
the next is introduced. The noise is either an arbitrary reordering or an
elementary transposition, per user input, but is always added to a randomly
selected vote (and for the transposition, performed at a randomly chosen
point within the vote). Each of the election rules is conducted again on
the altered profile, and if the outcome of the election is unchanged when
compared to the outcome of the initial unaltered election, a score of 1 is
added to the running score for that election rule. The fault is then removed
(and thus the original profile restored) before the next fault is introduced.
It should be noted that for the cases in which an election results in a tie, we
declare the candidate with the lowest index to be the winner, in the interest
of selecting an arbitrary candidate in a consistent fashion.
Following the completion of the 100 independent faults, the election is given
a robustness score for each election rule by dividing the number of faults that
maintained robustness by the total number of faults—the average robustness
for that specific election, per election rule. This is the data point that is
stored for later data analysis. The entire above process repeats once for each
(n,m) pair, a total of 4,080 elections.
Once each of the elections has been conducted with 100 independent faults,
the result is 100 distinct data points per election rule, each consisting of
the rule, n, m, and the average robustness for a profile of those dimensions.
For each rule, we find the mean robustness, the minimum and maximum
robustness scores (over all 100 data points), the standard deviation from
the mean, and the percentage of data points that are within plus or minus
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one standard deviation from the mean. This analysis is the data found in
the tables below, where the mean is µ, the minimum and maximum over all
data points are ≥ and ≤ respectively, the standard deviation is σ, and the
percentage within one standard deviation is ±1σ.
The algorithm described above is formally defined below in Figure 4.1.
rules← (Borda, plurality, veto, Copeland,Maximin,Bucklin, pluralitywithrunoff)
elections← 0
for all n such that 10 ≤ n ≤ 250 do
for all m such that 3 ≤ n ≤ 20 do
winners← []
robustness← []
for each rule in rules do
winners[rule]← rule(!V )
end for
scores← []
faults← 0
while faults < 100 do
!V ′← Add-Noise(!V )
for each rule in rules do
winner ← rule(!V ′)
if winner = winners[rule] then
scores[rule]← scores[rule] + 1
end if
end for
faults← faults+ 1
end while
for each rule in rules do
robustness[rule]← robustness[rule] ∪ (scores[rule]/100)
end for
end for
end for
Figure 4.1: The algorithm used to determine our experimental results.
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4.2 Results for Arbitrary Reordering
To complement our own research of the arbitrary reordering noise type, we
ran experiments for both random preference profiles and adversarial prefer-
ence profiles. The resulting data is provided in Table 4.1 for random profiles,
and Table 4.2 for adversarial profiles.
Rule µ ≥ ≤ σ ±1σ
Borda 0.877 0.250 1.000 0.175 0.80
Plurality 0.913 0.400 1.000 0.115 0.81
Veto 0.921 0.360 1.000 0.097 0.84
Copeland 0.845 0.130 1.000 0.189 0.82
Maximin 0.882 0.120 1.000 0.177 0.80
Bucklin 0.903 0.080 1.000 0.133 0.82
Plurality w. Runoff 0.879 0.280 1.000 0.144 0.81
Table 4.1: Arbitrary reordering robustness results for random elections with
100 faults each. The mean is denoted by µ, the minimum and maximum
over all data points by ≥ and ≤, standard deviation by σ, and percent within
one standard deviation by ±1σ.
Rule µ ≥ ≤ σ ±1σ
Borda 0.502 0.020 0.850 0.177 0.66
Plurality 0.214 0.010 0.660 0.129 0.77
Veto 0.502 0.040 0.960 0.222 0.60
Copeland 0.672 0.000 1.000 0.283 0.48
Maximin 0.523 0.010 1.000 0.192 0.85
Bucklin 0.271 0.010 1.000 0.159 0.72
Plurality w. Runoff 0.303 0.070 0.680 0.128 0.67
Table 4.2: Arbitrary reordering robustness results for adversarial elections
with 100 faults each. The mean is denoted by µ, the minimum and maximum
over all data points by ≥ and ≤, standard deviation by σ, and percent within
one standard deviation by ±1σ.
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4.3 Results for Elementary Transposition
For the purposes of comparison with previous work, for which no experimen-
tal data is available, we also conducted experiments using a single elemen-
tary transposition as the type of noise, rather than the arbitrary reordering.
The parameters are all identical to the experiments above, but with a single
randomly-placed transposition in the preference profile. The results can be
found in Table 4.3 for random profiles and Table 4.4 for adversarial profiles.
Rule µ ≥ ≤ σ ±1σ
Borda 0.984 0.290 1.000 0.070 0.94
Plurality 0.985 0.610 1.000 0.036 0.93
Veto 0.986 0.660 1.000 0.033 0.92
Copeland 0.987 0.390 1.000 0.037 0.93
Maximin 0.994 0.390 1.000 0.024 0.95
Bucklin 0.985 0.610 1.000 0.036 0.93
Plurality w. Runoff 0.984 0.570 1.000 0.037 0.92
Table 4.3: Elementary transposition robustness results for random elections
with 100 faults each. The mean is denoted by µ, the minimum and maximum
over all data points by ≥ and ≤, standard deviation by σ, and percent within
one standard deviation by ±1σ.
Rule µ ≥ ≤ σ ±1σ
Borda 0.864 0.010 1.000 0.269 0.88
Plurality 0.883 0.520 1.000 0.082 0.78
Veto 0.924 0.490 1.000 0.080 0.87
Copeland 1.000 0.610 1.000 0.006 1.00
Maximin 0.217 0.000 1.000 0.312 0.87
Bucklin 0.888 0.520 1.000 0.087 0.73
Plurality w. Runoff 0.896 0.380 1.000 0.078 0.85
Table 4.4: Elementary transposition robustness results for adversarial elec-
tions with 100 faults each. The mean is denoted by µ, the minimum and
maximum over all data points by ≥ and ≤, standard deviation by σ, and
percent within one standard deviation by ±1σ.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
A summary of our research results on the bounds of robustness for arbitrary
reordering, compared with the Procaccia et al. [27] results for elementary
transpositions, can be found in Table 3.1. It is unsurprising to find that the
bounds on robustness for some rules under arbitrary reordering are signifi-
cantly worse than the Procaccia et al. bounds on elementary transpositions;
however, it is certainly noteworthy that the upper bounds on Copeland and
Maximin are actually better for arbitrary reordering than for elementary
transposition. As discussed above in the section 3.2 definitions, an arbitrary
reordering is equivalent to a series of elementary transpositions confined to
a single vote. It is straightforward to see that, in general, the 1-robustness
of an arbitrary reordering is linked to the k-robustness of the elementary
transposition.
The maximum number of elementary transpositions required to equate a
single arbitrary reordering is the case in which a ranked preference list
is completely inverted. For such a scenario, m
2−m
2 transpositions are re-
quired (see proof of Proposition 1 of Section 3.2). Since the 1-robustness of
an arbitrary reordering is equivalent to the k-robustness of an elementary
transposition, where k is bounded by m
2−m
2 , the robustness of the arbitrary
reordering is lower by a factor of nearly m2. Furthermore, the difference
increases quadratically as m, the number of candidates, increases.
It was interesting to obtain experimental data on the robustness of these elec-
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tion rules, as we were unable to find previous work that does so. The results
are not necessarily surprising, though there are certainly many noteworthy
points worth discussion. Overall, it is reasonable to see that the robustness
scores are much higher than the lower bounds provided in both our work
and Procaccia et al. [27]. The experimental results are more of an average
case; in any random preference profile, it is obviously extremely unlikely
to have generated the worst case. Additionally, as would be expected, the
robustness scores for the elementary transposition are significantly higher
than for an arbitrary reordering.
The impetus for using a completely random preference profile was not to
simulate a “realistic” election; indeed, in a real-world political election, for
example, votes follow certain predictable patterns and trends, and are not
so chaotic as to be completely random. The goal was simply to provide a
glimpse at the robustness for an average, simple case. In other words, if
you arbitrarily choose a single preference profile from the set of all profiles,
how robust is it? While it does not provide a realistic election stimulation,
it does provide a reasonable metric of how robust the voting rules are in
comparison with one another.
Aside from the robustness scores of the random profiles are generally higher
for elementary transposition than for arbitrary reordering, as was expected,
there are several differences. In comparison among rules, the scores for
elementary transposition are much more densely clustered, with a spread
of just over 2%, while the spread for arbitrary reordering is well over 9%.
The maximum value in every case pertaining to random profiles is 100%,
and the minimums have a comparable spread between noise types, with one
exception: the minimum Borda robustness for elementary transpositions is
markedly lower than the other elementary transposition minimums. The
reason for this is unclear.
Perhaps the most obvious and relevant difference between the types of noise
is the data related to standard deviation: the standard deviations for elemen-
tary transpositions are extremely low in comparison to those for arbitrary
reordering, often below 3%. The percentage within one standard deviation
is also much higher, which follows logically from having a lower standard de-
viation. Overall, this indicates there is much less variance in the robustness
of elementary transpositions. Due to the nature of the aforementioned rela-
tionship between the two types of noise, it is reasonable that the robustness
of an arbitrary reordering varies to a much greater degree.
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The purpose of the “adversarial” preference profiles was to investigate the
robustness in an election where the candidates’ scores are tied, or nearly so.
For some voting rules, this may be the actual worst case, but regardless, it
straightforward to see that this model of election will be more consistently
susceptible to noise than a random election would be. As expected, the
robustness scores for the adversarial profiles are markedly lower than those
of the random profiles.
During the course of our research on the arbitrary reordering, we conceived
another third type of noise that we had not previously considered, but that
may be interesting to study: a noncontiguous swap. While an elementary
transposition swaps the rank of two adjacent candidates in a preference list,
a noncontiguous swap does not require the candidates be adjacent, only
within the same vote. Such swaps became relevant in counting the safe
permutations of an arbitrary reordering, and serves as a sort of “middle
ground” between elementary transposition and arbitrary reordering. Fur-
ther investigation into this type of noise may yield worthwhile results.
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Appendix A
Suppression
We originally intended to investigate two different forms of noise: both the
arbitrary reordering use throughout the work above, and also suppression.
The concept of suppression is simply when an entire vote is “lost,” or re-
moved from the preference profile. Ultimately we directed our research away
from suppression and focused solely on arbitrary reordering. The primary
reason for this was that it quickly became apparent that it was difficult to
obtain meaningful results for suppression. In a worst case scenario, the loss
of an entire vote will always affect the election outcome, resulting in a ro-
bustness score of 0. In an average case, we do not expect the suppression
of a vote to be very significant, since no candidate’s score will increase as a
result. We initially considered revisiting the notion of suppression following
our work on reordering, but given the time constraints and scope of this par-
ticular work, it became infeasible. Included here is the preliminary research
we conducted regarding suppression.
A.1 Definitions
A type of noise we call suppression occurs when a voter’s entire ordinal
preference list is removed from the preference profile and not counted at all.
While this cannot strictly be achieved via elementary transpositions, it is
an equally probable form of data corruption in the voting environment. A
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suppression is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given a preference profile !V and a voter vi ∈ V , the pref-
erence profile !V i is obtained from !V by a suppression if the following
hold:
1. V i = V − {vi}
2. !V i= 〈!1, . . . ,!i−1,!i+1, . . . ,!n〉
The reader may be concerned with the sequential indexing problem that
results from suppressing a voter and the voter’s ordinal preferences. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the voter indices are renumbered follow-
ing the suppression, i.e. suppressing voter i from V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} yields
V i = {v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn} which is renumbered to V i = {v1, . . . , vn−1}.
The same is true for !V , i.e. !V 1= 〈!i, . . . ,!n−1〉.
Definition 2. The k-robustness of a preference profile!V under suppression
of k voters vi ∈ V for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, written γk(!V ) =!V k , is:
ργk(F,!V ) = Pr&V k∼ γk(&V )
[
F (!V ) = F (!V k)
]
.
Definition 3. The k-robustness of a voting rule F under suppression of k
voters vi ∈ V for i = 1, . . . , k with n voters and m candidates is:
ρn,mγk (F ) = min&V k∈L(C)n
ργk(F,!V
k
).
A.2 Theorems
Since the idea of suppression is not a straightforward adaptation of the
elementary transposition, we explicitly prove that a suppression can alter
the outcome of an election:
Theorem 1. Let F : LV → C be a voting rule such that Ran(F ) > 1. Then
there exists a preference profile !V , a voter vi ∈ V , and a profile !V i, which
is obtained from !V by a suppression, such that F (!V ) (= F (!V i).
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Proof. Since Ran(F ) > 1, there must exist two preference profiles !V1 and
!V2 such that F (!V1 ) (= F (!V2 ). Furthermore, all preference profiles are
series of permutations on C and any preference profile can be obtained
from another by iterative elementary transpositions. It follows that !V2
can be obtained from !V1 by a series of elementary transpositions with t
intermediate states such that !Vi1! . . .!!Vit where !Vi1 =!V1 and !Vit =!V2 .
Since F (!V1 ) (= F (!V2 ), it also follows that there exists a pivotal interme-
diate state !Vih such that F (!Vih) = F (!V1 ) and F (!Vih+1) = F (!V2 ), and
transitively F (!Vih) (= F (!Vih+1). Given the suppression of the voter vi ∈ V
whose ordinal preferences were transposed in !Vih!!Vih+1 , it holds true that
!V iih =!V
i
ih+1
. However, since F (!Vih) (= F (!Vih+1), it must be the case that
F (!V iih ) (= F (!Vih) or F (!V
i
ih+1
) (= F (!Vih+1).
Proposition 2. Given k suppressions, ρn,mγk (F ) ≥ (ρn,mγ1 (F ))k.
Proof. Consider the preference profile !V1 and the preference profile !V k2
obtained from it by k independent and random suppressions. We claim the
probability that F (!V1 ) = F (!V k2 ) is at least (ρn,mγ1 )k. Let !Vi1 , . . . ,!V
k
ik+1
be the intermediate preference profiles obtained by the suppressions, where
!Vi1 = !V1 , !V
k
ik+1 = !V2 , and each !V
n−j
ij+1 is obtained from !V
n−j−1
ij
by a
random and independent suppression for j = 1, . . . , k. By the definition
of 1-robustness, for every preference profile !V i , the probability that one
randomly chosen suppression does not change the outcome of the election
under F is at least ρn,mγ1 (F ). Therefore, for j = 1, . . . , k,
Pr
[
F (!V n−j−1ij ) = F (!V
n−j
ij+1 ) | !V
n−j−1
ij
]
≥ ρn,mγ1 (F ).
Therefore:
Pr
[
F (!V1 ) = F (!V2 )
]
=
k∏
j=1
Pr
[
F (!V n−j−1ij ) = F (!V
n−j
ij+1 ) | !V
n−j−1
ij
]
≥ (ρn,mγ1 )k.
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Appendix B
Source Code
Below is the source code for the program used to conduct the experiments.
It is written to run in version 2.5 of the Python interpreter.
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any
later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITH-
OUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MER-
CHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
For a copy of the GNU General Public License, see http://www.gnu.org/
licenses/.
"""Conducts a number of different elections based on well-defined and
studied election rules.
The preference profile should always be represented as an n x m matrix,
where n is the number of voters and m is the number of candidates. It
is essentially a list of all voters, where each voter is represented by
a list of candidates in preference order.
"""
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import random
import sys
import copy
import csv
import optparse
from decimal import Decimal
class vote(object):
"""Represents a single voter’s ordinal preferences.
All indices are 0-based, e.g. the highest-ranked candidate is in
position 0.
"""
# The ordinal preference list
_pref = []
# Reverse mapping of candidate to ranking
# e.g. _index[2] = 0 means candidate 2 is ranked 1st
_index = []
def __init__(self, prefOrSize):
"""Constructor takes either an ordinal preference list, or an int
representing the length of a list to be randomly generated.
"""
if type(prefOrSize) == int:
# initialize to ascending list
self._pref = range(prefOrSize)
# and scramble it
random.shuffle(self._pref)
elif type(prefOrSize) == list:
# Empty slice creates a copy of the list.
# This is important since lists are passed by reference.
self._pref = prefOrSize[:]
else:
# Only takes list or int. Could take some other iterables
# e.g. tuple, but order matters and thus not all iterables
# are acceptable.
raise TypeError(’Must be preference list or int size of random ’ \
’vote.’)
# Initialize index mapping to 0’s
self._index = [0] * self.size()
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for x in xrange(self.size()):
# Index maps candidate number to ranking
self._index[self._pref[x]] = x
def scramble(self):
"""Randomly reorders the preference list of the vote."""
random.shuffle(self._pref)
# Must update index after scrambling, like at creation time.
for x in xrange(self.size()):
self._index[self._pref[x]] = x
def transposition(self):
"""Performs a random elementary transposition."""
# Select a random point for the transposition
p = random.randint(0, len(self._pref) - 2)
# Swap p and p+1
tmp = self._pref[p]
self._pref[p] = self._pref[p + 1]
self._pref[p + 1] = tmp
# Must update index after transposition, like at creation time.
for x in xrange(self.size()):
self._index[self._pref[x]] = x
def size(self):
"""Returns the length of the preference list."""
return len(self._pref)
def rank(self, candidate):
"""Returns the rank of the given candiate in this vote’s preference
list.
"""
return self._index[candidate]
def pos(self, position):
"""Returns the candidate with the given rank.
This is equivlent to calling getitem with square brackets.
"""
return self._pref[position]
def __getitem__(self, key):
"""Overload accesses candidate in the given position."""
if type(key) != int:
# Support for slices could be added easily, but there is no
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# need at this point in time.
raise TypeError(’Only int keys are allowed, no slices.’)
return self.pos(key)
def winner(score, top=1):
"""Determines the winner of an election given a list of the
candidates’ scores.
The score parameter is to be a list of numerical scores, ordered by
candidate index. The scale of scores is irrelevant, as they are
compared only relative to each other.
The top parameter will return all the candidates ranked in the top
n places, including all ties.
The function returns a tuple of the indices of the winning
candidates (even if there is only one).
"""
# Creates pairs of (candidate,score),
# then sorts by score highest to lowest
# Important note: the secondary sort order is by index, since they
# are first sorted as such by the virture of the enumeration
# This comes into play for ’arbitrary’ selection of ties using the
# minimum index. (Stable sort guaranteed by Python 2.3 and later.)
index = list(enumerate(score))
index.sort(key=lambda x: x[1])
wins = [] # the list of winners
last = -1 # previous candidates score, used to find ties
go = True
# Loops until top n candidates are found, including ties
while go:
next = index.pop() # next highest scoring candidate
if len(wins) < top or next[1] == last:
# Haven’t met "top" req,
# Or this candidate tied with the last one
wins.append(next[0])
last = next[1]
else:
# Otherwise, wins is complete and we stop the loop
go = False
if not index:
# There are no more scores, stop the loop
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go = False
return tuple(wins)
def scoringRule(alpha, votes, top=1):
"""Scores candidates given a preference profile and an alpha
vector, and returns the indices of the winners.
This is intended as a helper function for "scoring rule" functions,
but could be used separately if needed.
The alpha vector, which must be the same size as the candidate list,
provides a numberical score for each rank.
The votes parameter is an n x m matrix representing the preference
profile.
The top parameter is a pass-through to the winner() function.
"""
size = len(alpha)
score = [0] * size
# Detect malformed preferences or alpha vector
for v in votes:
if v.size() != size:
raise IndexError(’All votes must be the same size as the alpha ’ \
’vector.’)
# Adds the alpha vector value to the score list based on rank in
# the preference profile
for i,s in enumerate(alpha):
for v in votes:
score[v[i]] += s
return winner(score, top=top)
def pairwise(c1, c2, votes):
"""Conducts a pairwise election between given candidates c1 and c2.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
score = [0,0]
# Simply adds 1 for each time a candidate is ranked above the other
for v in votes:
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if v.rank(c1) < v.rank(c2):
score[0] += 1
else:
score[1] += 1
return tuple(score)
def borda(votes):
"""Conducts a Borda election using the scoringRule() function.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
# Alpha vector is {m, m-1, m-2, ..., 0}
alpha = range(votes[0].size() - 1, -1, -1)
return scoringRule(alpha, votes)
def plurality(votes):
"""Conducts a plurality election using the scoringRule() function.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
# Alpha vector is {1, 0, 0,..., 0}
alpha = [0] * votes[0].size()
alpha[0] = 1
return scoringRule(alpha, votes)
def plurality2(votes):
"""Conducts a "top 2" plurality election using the scoringRule()
function.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
# Same vector is plurality, but has top=2 param
alpha = [0] * votes[0].size()
alpha[0] = 1
return scoringRule(alpha, votes, 2)
def veto(votes):
"""Conducts a veto election using the scoringRule() function.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
# Alpha vector is {1, 1, ..., 1, 0}
alpha = [1] * votes[0].size()
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alpha[-1] = 0
return scoringRule(alpha, votes)
def copeland(votes):
"""Conducts a Copeland election.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
size = votes[0].size()
score = [0] * size
# Conducts pairwise elections for every candidate pairing
for c1 in xrange(size):
for c2 in (c for c in xrange(size) if c != c1):
pw = pairwise(c1, c2, votes)
if pw[0] > pw[1]:
score[c1] += 1
# No ’else’ here because c2 < c1 case is handled
# in the opposite iteration
return winner(score)
def maximin(votes):
"""Conducts a Maximin (Minimax) election.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
size = votes[0].size()
score = [size**2] * size
for c1 in xrange(size):
for c2 in (c for c in xrange(size) if c != c1):
pw = pairwise(c1, c2, votes)[0]
if pw < score[c1]:
score[c1] = pw
return winner(score)
def bucklin(votes):
"""Conducts a Bucklin election.
votes must be the n x m preference profile matrix.
"""
size = votes[0].size()
for l in xrange(size):
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# l is the deepest level we look at
# Proceed deeper until a majority is reached
# Start with blank scores for each new level
score = [0] * size
for j in xrange(size):
for v in votes:
if v.rank(j) <= l:
# Candidate j is ranked above l threshold
score[j] += 1
if max(score) > (size / 2):
# Majority has been achieved, terminate
break
return winner(score)
def pwr(votes):
"""Conducts a Plurality with Runoff election.
votes must be the n x m pereference profile matrix.
"""
# Round 1: top 2 plurality
c1, c2 = plurality2(votes)[:2]
# Round 2: pairwise runoff
s1, s2 = pairwise(c1, c2, votes)
if s1 > s2:
return (c1,)
elif s2 > s1:
return (c2,)
else:
return (c1, c2)
def calc_stats(data):
"""Given a list of robustness scores, calculates the mean, standard
deviation from the mean, and precentage of points within +/- 1
standard deviation from the mean.
Returns tuple of mean, standard deviation, within 1 std deviation.
"""
n = Decimal(len(data))
# First find the mean
total = sum(data)
mean = total / n
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# Calculate the average variance (square of the std dev)
variance = 0
for p in data:
# Variance is the square of distance from the mean
variance += (p - mean) ** 2
variance /= n
# Calculate the std dev
stdev = variance.sqrt()
# Use std dev to find % within 1 std dev
w1stdev = 0
for p in data:
# Difference from the mean is within the std dev
if abs(p - mean) <= stdev:
w1stdev += 1
w1stdev /= Decimal(n)
return mean, stdev, w1stdev
def random_profile(n, m):
"""Generates a random preference profile using the given
constraints.
n is the number of voters, and m is the number of candidates.
"""
votes = []
for j in xrange(n):
# vote ctor makes random profile by default
v = vote(m)
votes.append(v)
return votes
def adversarial_profile(n, m):
"""Generates an adversarial preference profile using the given
constraints.
The adversarial profile is successive left circular shifts of the
profile <1,2,...,m>, e.g. {<1,2,...,m>, <2,3,...,m,1>, ...}.
n is the number of voters, and m is the number of candidates.
"""
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votes = []
# The initial <1,2,...,m> profile
base = range(m)
for i in xrange(n):
# Have to use copies because the list is a reference
nvote = vote(copy.copy(base))
votes.append(nvote)
# Move first candidate to end
t = base.pop(0)
base.append(t)
return votes
def election(rule, votes, one=True):
"""Conducts an election given the election rule and preference profile.
rule is a reference to one of the above election rules, and votes
is a standard preference profile.
The optional one parameter specifies whether ties must broken.
"""
wins = rule(votes)
if one or len(wins) == 1:
# Restrict to 1 candidate by arbitrary selection of
# min index OR
# There was only 1 winner anyway
wins = wins[0]
return wins
def nm_gen():
"""Generates all valid pairs of (n,m), where 10 <= n <= 250 and 3 <= m <= 20.
"""
n = 10
m = 3
while m <= 20:
yield n, m
n += 1
if n > 250:
n = 10
m += 1
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if __name__ == ’__main__’:
usage = """usage: %prog profile-type noise-type [-e elections] [-f faults] [-o filename]
[--ties]
profile-type may be either "random" for randomly generated elections, or
"adversarial" for elections of the adversarial type. Abbreviations accepted.
noise-type may be either "ar" for arbitrary reordering, or "et" for elementary
transposition.
Try -h or --help for more information."""
parser = optparse.OptionParser(usage=usage)
parser.add_option(’-f’, dest=’faults’, type=’int’, default=100,
help=’the number of faults to introduce per election, default 100’)
parser.add_option(’-o’, dest=’filename’, default=’vote-data.csv’,
help=’the name of the data output file, default ’ \
’"vote-data.csv".’)
parser.add_option(’--ties’, action=’store_false’, dest=’one’, default=True,
help=’returns all ties as winners, default is to select’ \
’ a single winner’)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
if len(args) < 2:
parser.error(’incorrect number of arguments’)
if ’random’.startswith(args[0].lower()):
profile_create = random_profile
elif ’adversarial’.startswith(args[0].lower()):
profile_create = adversarial_profile
else:
parser.error(’invalid profile type’)
if args[1].lower() == ’ar’:
noise_type = 0
elif args[1].lower() == ’et’:
noise_type = 1
else:
parser.error(’invalid noise type’)
rules = (’borda’, ’plurality’, ’veto’, ’copeland’, ’maximin’, ’bucklin’, ’pwr’)
# 0 func, 1 robust, 2 min, 3 max, 4 current winner, 5 list of scores
data = {}
for func in rules:
# default values
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data[func] = [eval(func), 0, 1, 0, None, []]
fout = open(options.filename, ’wb’)
csvout = csv.writer(fout, dialect=’excel’)
gen = nm_gen() # generates all valid pairs of (n,m)
for n,m in gen:
# Creates the list of n votes, fills with random vote of size m
votes = profile_create(n, m)
for rule in rules:
# call election rule to get winner(s) and record it for
# future comparison
data[rule][4] = election(data[rule][0], votes, options.one)
# for each required fault
for j in xrange(options.faults):
# pick a random vote (by index)
ri = random.randrange(n)
# keep a copy of the original
orig = copy.deepcopy(votes[ri])
# introduce noise
if noise_type == 0:
votes[ri].scramble()
elif noise_type == 1:
votes[ri].transposition()
for rule in rules:
# see if the outcome changed for any of the rules
if election(data[rule][0], votes, options.one) == data[rule][4]:
# outcome did not change, add 1 to robustness score
data[rule][1] += 1
# replace the scrambled vote with the original
votes[ri] = orig
for rule in rules:
# calculate robustness % score
robust = data[rule][1] / Decimal(options.faults)
data[rule][5].append(robust)
data[rule][1] = 0
# update max and min
if robust < data[rule][2]:
data[rule][2] = robust
elif robust > data[rule][3]:
data[rule][3] = robust
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csvout.writerow((rule, n, m, robust))
fout.close()
head = ’ Rule Mean Min Max Std Dev <= 1 SD’
print head
print ’-’ * len(head)
for rule in rules:
mean, stdev, w1stdev = calc_stats(data[rule][5])
dp = (rule.capitalize(), mean, data[rule][2], data[rule][3], stdev, w1stdev)
print ’%-9s %-4.3f %-3.3f %-3.3f %-6.3f %.2f’ % dp
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